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Why the end of the Cold War doesn’t matter:
the US war of terror in Colombia
D O U G  S T O K E S *
Abstract. Orthodox narratives of US foreign policy have been employed as uncontested
modes of historical interpretation with US post-Cold War foreign policy in the Third World
characterised by discontinuity from its earlier Cold War objectives. Chomsky’s work adopts
an alternative revisionist historiography that views US post-Cold War foreign policy as
characterised by continuity with its earlier Cold War objectives. This article examines the
continuities of US post-Cold War policy in Colombia, and explains this in terms of the
maintenance of US access to South American oil, the preservation of regional (in)stability
and the continued need to destroy challenges to US-led neoliberalism.
Both conservative and liberal mainstream foreign policy analysts, and the majority
of International Relations (IR) scholars, interpret US foreign policy as benign and
democratic.1 The Cold War is commonly viewed in bipolar terms with a funda-
mentally hostile and expansionist East versus a defensive, if over-reactive West. With
the end of the Cold War, and although some critical IR theorists challenge the
benign image of US foreign policy,2 there has emerged an overwhelming orthodox
interpretation of US post-Cold War policy as characterised by discontinuities from
the earlier Cold War period.3 Within IR there thus exists a prevailing discontinuity
thesis which unites the majority of both mainstream and critically inclined IR
scholars when examining post-Cold War US foreign policy.
The work of Noam Chomsky rejects both the benign and democratic image of
US foreign policy and the prevailing post-Cold War discontinuity thesis.4 For
Chomsky, post-Cold War US foreign policy is characterised by overwhelming con-
tinuities with its earlier Cold War concerns, and continues to be malign and anti-
democratic when US elite demands are opposed. He employs a revisionist historio-
graphy which traces the basis of these post-Cold War continuities to the interests
and institutions that have remained in place to preserve a world order conducive for
US capital and that largely dictate the direction and forms that US foreign policy
takes.5 For Chomsky, the orthodox interpretation of US foreign policy provides the
conditions of possibility for the claim of discontinuity in the post-Cold War era
through its emphasis on the alleged centrality that Cold War bipolar tensions had
upon US foreign policy in the developing world. The revisionist position rejects the
subordination of North-South relations to an East-West framework and instead
adopts a view of world order characterised by long-term structural inequalities and
the differential distribution of power between the developed capitalist North and the
underdeveloped South. Chomsky’s work thus goes against the prevailing consensus
within IR as a discipline and provides a radically different interpretation of post-
Cold War US foreign policy than that of both mainstream and some of the more
critical IR theorists. Chomsky’s continuity thesis also offers an alternative normative
framework for understanding international relations through its explicit focus on
issues of exploitation between the developed industrialised North and the under-
developed global South. His work moves away from an overly Eurocentric East
versus West interpretation of the Cold War and is sensitive to the ways in which
Western policies continue to lead to human rights violations in underdeveloped
nations in the post-Cold War era. This makes his work valuable both through its
challenge to the prevailing conventional wisdom within IR, and because it is an
interesting and often neglected perspective on the underlying objectives of US
foreign policy.
In this article, I seek to test both the prevailing discontinuity thesis within IR and
Chomsky’s alternative continuity thesis on post-Cold War US foreign policy using a
case study of contemporary US foreign policy in Colombia. Colombia is the third
largest recipient of US military aid. This aid is said to be for a war on drugs and,
after 11 September, for a war on terror. Concomitantly, these orientations purport
to demonstrate a major discontinuity from the US’s Cold War concerns of anti-
communist counter-insurgency warfare in Colombia. The levels of US military aid,
combined with the stated justifications for this aid, thus represent a good test for the
competing discontinuity and continuity positions. Also, the continued abuse of
human rights in Colombia and the role that US policy has played in either stemming
or exacerbating these abuses also allows a testing of the allegedly benign or malign
images of US foreign policy that sit at the heart of the two competing positions. If
the discontinuity thesis is correct, we can expect to see US policy aimed at the
primary narco-traffickers and terrorists in Colombia. US policy should also be
helping to strengthen democracy and human rights. Conversely, if Chomsky’s
continuity thesis is correct we can expect to see a continued counter-insurgency war
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against groups and sectors of Colombian society that threaten the interests of US
capital. In my empirical examination of US policy in Colombia, I use primary
source documentation from US government agencies, human rights reports, and
declassified information. I conclude that US policy is indeed characterised by con-
tinuities with its earlier Cold War concerns. This then raises the question of why
such continuity exists. I explain this in terms of the significant US oil interests in the
South American region, combined with the desire to support a pro-US government.
Moreover, US policy in Colombia continues to lead to significant and widespread
human rights abuses. US objectives and policy in contemporary Colombia thus
demonstrate significant continuity with the US’s Cold War preoccupations, confirm-
ing Chomsky’s continuity thesis.
Mainstream views of US foreign policy during the Cold War: East versus West
Liberal and conservative views on US foreign policy during and after the Cold War
have a great deal in common. Both tend to view the Cold War in bipolar terms and
work with an orthodox historical interpretation of its origins and operation.6 They
also emphasise the discontinuity characteristic of US foreign policy in the post-Cold
War period. An orthodox historiography views the Soviet Union as having had
expansionist tendencies throughout the Cold War, and as fundamentally hostile to
Western security. Conversely, US foreign policy is viewed as principally driven by
a defensive reaction against Soviet expansionism.7 US foreign policy is thus seen
as being formulated in response to the inherently hostile nature of the bipolar
competition.8
Ostensibly to resist Soviet expansionism, the US instituted the central Cold War
doctrine of containment.9 George Kennan, the architect of containment policy,
argues that the immediate task of US containment after the Second World War
was to use economic aid to insulate the shattered Western European capitalist
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economies from the threat posed by the Soviet Union.10 As Western Europe was
rebuilt and incorporated within a US-led international order, US containment
strategies increasingly shifted to the third world and primarily took the form of
military campaigns. The campaigns were justified using a Cold War discourse of
anti-communism and sought to stem alleged Soviet expansionism within the
periphery and to support pro-US governments in their counter-insurgency
campaigns.11 The third world was characterised by US planners as particularly
susceptible to Soviet subversion due to its socioeconomic instability, chronic
inequality, and the internally fragile nature of many developing world states. The
domino theory provided a succinct visual metaphor for the potential spread of
regional pro-Soviet subversion. It was argued that if this were to happen, US
credibility would be weakened in the eyes of its allies, and its resolve to resist
Soviet aggression would be questioned.12
In resisting and rolling back alleged Soviet aggression in the Third World, the US
sometimes carried out covert warfare and government destabilisation. The US also
installed and backed a number of pro-US dictatorships throughout the periphery as
a bulwark against what were characterised as Soviet-backed insurgencies. Although
these regimes’ practices were frequently anti-democratic, and they often carried out
human rights abuses, these policies were deemed necessary to resist the alleged
negative consequences for both US and global security should a pro-Soviet regime
assume power. Conservative scholars argue that this was an unfortunate but
necessary policy consequence in resisting the global spread of Soviet communism.13
Liberal scholars tend to argue that sometimes US fears were overstated, and have
examined the role that Cold War belief systems have played in exaggerating US
perceptions of Soviet expansion in the periphery, the influence that domestic power
groups have exerted on US foreign policy, and the effect that bureaucratic rivalry has
had upon US foreign policy formation.14 However, the divergence between conserv-
ative and liberal opinion over policy means during the Cold War tends not to extend
to divergence over the ends, the US’s innate right to pursue these ends, or the
essentially benign character of US foreign policy.
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Discontinuities in post-Cold War world order
With the end of the Cold War a discontinuity thesis has emerged when analysing US
foreign policy that portrays a radically altered world. Pessimistic commentators
argue that the post-Cold War world is potentially more dangerous for the US. The
primary themes to have emerged range from new threats to US security from increased
intercapitalist competition, the emergence of expansionist and belligerent ethnic
nationalisms, the dangerous absence of any overarching US grand strategy in the
post-Cold War world, and new and more deadly forms of ‘post-modern’ identity
warfare.15 Analysts have pointed to the ordering effect that bipolarity had on
international relations and the increased potentiality for new political tensions
emerging in a multipolar world.16 More optimistically inclined interpretations of the
post-Cold War period have emphasised the end of ideological struggle with the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the global triumph of liberal capitalism.17 A
number of commentators have argued that with the end of bipolarity, and the lessen-
ing of global tensions, the promotion of liberal democracy can now form the
cornerstone of post-Cold War US foreign policy. Ikenberry, for example, argues that
US foreign policy has always contained a Wilsonian liberalism premised on human
rights, the promotion of democracy and free trade, and the development of
international institutions to constrain interstate conflict. With the end of the Cold
War, Ikenberry berates the pessimists and argues that for ‘all the talk about drift and
confusion in American foreign policy, the United States is seized by a robust and
distinctive grand strategy’ of post-Cold War liberalism.18 In a similar vein, Tony
Smith argues for the mutually beneficial role that a ‘national security liberalism’ can
have for the US’s national interests because a democratic and stable world is more
conducive for long term US interests.19
These arguments all share a number of broad assumptions. First, they project an
image of US foreign policy as an essentially benign force in international relations.
Second, they share a common orthodox interpretation of the Cold War that
constructs it in bipolar terms with a profound global competition between the
capitalist West and the communist East. Third, US policy is viewed as defensively
reactive to Soviet expansionism in Third World nations during the Cold War. And
lastly, they perceive US foreign policy as characterised by (albeit differently inter-
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preted) discontinuities and changes in the post-Cold War period. All of these
assumptions have been rejected in the work of Noam Chomsky, who employs an
alternative revisionist historiography of the Cold War to rethink such conventional
assumptions. His rethinking also guides his interpretation of the post-Cold War
period which he sees as characterised by continuities with the Cold War and, indeed,
pre-Cold War periods.
Chomsky’s view of US foreign policy during the Cold War: North versus South
Chomsky employs a revisionist historical interpretation of the Cold War which
challenges the presupposition that the USSR was inherently aggressive and threaten-
ing to Western security during the Cold War and that US foreign policy was
primarily driven in relation to these threats. Instead, revisionist historians contend
that US foreign policy is overwhelmingly driven by the geoeconomic interests of
US capital and the construction of a world order conducive to those interests.20
Revisionists argue that in the immediate post-War period the US’s main concern was
‘not the containment of Communism, but rather more directly the extension and
expansion of American capitalism, according to its new economic power and
needs’.21 American capitalism required the structural domination of the developing
South by the developed North. Chomsky argues that the Cold War, whilst unique in
its intensity, was but a part of a much longer period of exploitative North/South
relations that spans approximately 500 years.22 He thus subordinates the Cold War
as a structural feature of a much longer period of exploitative relations between the
developed capitalist economies and the poorer, underdeveloped nations.
For Chomsky, the mainstream understanding of the Cold War has a particular
ideological effect. The Soviet threat, and the US’s need to contain it, was overstated
during the Cold War to serve two primary purposes. First, the creation of the Cold
War military-industrial complex provided a public justification for massive state
interventionism in the US economy. Chomsky quotes John Lewis Gaddis, who
argued that containment ‘has been the product, not so much of what the Russians
have done, or of what has happened elsewhere in the world, but of internal forces
operating within the United States . . . What is surprising is the primacy that has
been accorded economic considerations in shaping strategies of containment, to the
exclusion of other considerations.’23 This economic interventionism laid the founda-
tions for postwar US economic growth and served US capital in so far as it provided
massive levels of protectionism for crucial high-tech industries (for example, the
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capital-intensive computing and automation industries). It also socialised private
investment risks and guaranteed vast, state-subsidised profits.24 Former US Deputy
Under Secretary of Defence, Charles Duncan Jr., summarised the position clearly
when he stated ‘Why, you may ask, do some have the view that the Soviet Union has
become the world’s number one military power? The answer is that, to a large extent,
we have created that image ourselves . . . in the understandable desire to reverse the
anti-defence mood and propensity for reduced defence budgets . . .’.25 US military
spending also stimulated the economies of key US allies deemed crucial for the
postwar political economy. These allies included Western Europe through the US
purchase of strategic raw materials from European colonies, Japan during the
Korean War and South Korea during the Vietnam War.26
Second, and more importantly for this article, the Soviet threat served as a
convenient pretext for justifying US military interventionism in the Third World,
which, according to the logic of North–South relations, was necessary to maintain
access to raw materials and markets and ensure cheap labour, to maintain regimes
favourable to US interests, and to stifle or overthrow movements considered inimical
to US interests.27 Kennan summarised the private objectives of US policy clearly in
1948:
We have about 50% of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3% of its population. . . . Our real task
in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships that will permit us to maintain this
position of disparity. . . . To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and
daydreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate
national objectives. . . . We should cease to talk about vague and...unreal objectives such as
human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratisation. The day is not far off
when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered
by idealistic slogans, the better.28
When understood in this context, Chomsky argues that the primary threat to US
interests within the third world was any movement or political party that threatened
to end its country’s position of disparity and use its national resources for the
majority of its people.29 As the US’s postwar reliance on Third World resources
increased, US interests were inevitably increasingly pitted against the forces that
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sought more egalitarian forms of socioeconomic reform, and which therefore threat-
ened US interests. The agents of change took many forms, but were overwhelmingly
nationalist in orientation throughout the third world.30
There was thus an overriding geoeconomic rationale guiding US foreign policy
during the Cold War, which sought to construct a capitalist world order conducive
to its interests. These interests were primarily economic in orientation with con-
comitant strategic rationales and reality constraints that guided policy orientation.
Any serious attempt to exit from US control was invariably constructed as a mani-
festation of communism to manufacture consent for US foreign policy regardless of
the actual orientation of the forces of change.31 Chomsky argues that the structural
domination of the developing South by the developed North forms an overarching
continuity in the post-Cold War era.
Chomsky and the post-Cold War era: continuities in world order
As outlined above, mainstream analysis tends to emphasise or presuppose the changed
nature of the post-Cold War era. This is a logical position given the fact that the
Cold War is understood in East-West terms, and US foreign policy is understood as
reacting to the international structure that changed with the end of the Cold War.
Chomsky’s use of a revisionist perspective, however, traces the continuities in the
post-Cold War world order. This is again logical given the fact that he locates
foreign policy decision-making within the strategic and geoeconomic rationales of
US capital, and the institutions that have arisen to protect it, all of which have
largely remained in the post-Cold War era. For Chomsky, the primary discon-
tinuities have been the reasons given for US intervention. The discourse of anti-
communism no longer provides a public justification for US intervention so new
reasons must now be found. In the next section I test both the mainstream and
Chomsky’s positions on the alleged continuities or discontinuities in the post-Cold
War era using the case study of US intervention in relation to Colombia.
Throughout the Cold War, the primary justification for US military training and
funding of developing world armies was the stated need to contain Soviet expan-
sionism.32 In the post-Cold War era, the US has continued to fund and train
developing world militaries, but the central reasons now given for this training have
switched from a Cold War containment discourse, to new rationales and justifica-
tions. This shift in the centrality of these threats to US security, and the alleged
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reorientation of pro-US militaries to concentrate their efforts against these threats,
signals a major discontinuity in US foreign security policy.
During the Cold War, Colombia was one of the largest Latin American recipients
of US military aid. For Example, ‘Plan Lazo’ was the first major US reorganisation
of the Colombian military for anti-communist counter-insurgency during the 1960s,
and was the biggest US military aid package for any Latin American military until
the Reagan administration’s counter-insurgency assistance for the El Salvadoran
government in the 1980s.33 US military aid to Colombia throughout the Cold War
was primarily for anti-communist counter-insurgency.34 In the post-Cold War era
US funding of the Colombian military has continued with Colombia now the
world’s third largest recipient of US military aid with over $2 bn given between 2000
and 2002 alone. The US has argued that this money will be now be used for the fight
against narco-traffickers and international terrorists. The volume of money given by
the US, combined with the stated reasons for this money, makes Colombia a good
test as to whether US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era has changed or not. I
take the stated justifications for US post-Cold War policy – a war on drugs and a
war on terror – and then examine primary source documentation such as official US
agencies reports and human rights reports to assess whether these justifications
stand up to scrutiny.
The US’s discontinuity thesis: the war on drugs
Between 2000 and 2001, the Clinton administration committed itself to Plan Colombia;
a 1.3 bn dollar military aid package given by the US to the Colombian military. The
stated objective of this military aid was the eradication of coca plantations and what
the US called left-wing ‘narco-guerrillas’ who were explicitly said to be involved in
the coca trade. Democrat Senator Joseph Biden stated in 2000 that never ‘before in
recent history has there been such an opportunity to strike at all aspects of the drug
trade at the source . . . Helping Colombia is squarely in America’s national interest.
It is the source of many of the drugs that are poisoning our people.’35 Former US
President Bill Clinton argued that Plan Colombia would ‘increase incentives for the
peaceful resolution of the civil war, while helping the government staunch the flow
of drugs to our shores’.36
To allegedly strike drugs at their source, a number of joint US and Colombian
military initiatives have taken place including the formation of two 950-man counter-
narcotics divisions and additional funding for another division. The counter-
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narcotic units equipped by the US have been trained for a ‘southern push’ into the
Putumayo region of Colombia where the 20,000 member, left-wing guerrilla group,
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), are concentrated. The US
argues that the FARC are criminal narco-guerrillas who traffic in cocaine to fund
their war against the Colombian state. As part of the $1.3 bn package, the US has
provided a $341 m upgrade to radar facilities in Colombia and shares intelligence on
guerrilla activity in the southern areas. A riverine programme has been deployed
along the rivers on the Ecuadorian border to the south.37 The US Department of
Defence states that there are approximately 250–300 US military personnel and
400–500 US mercenaries contracted to work in Colombia.
Chomsky’s continuity thesis: counter-insurgency against left-wing rebels
In existence throughout Colombia, but primarily concentrated in Colombia’s north,
are well-armed right-wing paramilitary groups, the largest of which is the umbrella
organisation, the AUC (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) that has
approximately 10,000 combatants and is headed by Carlos Castano. James Milford,
the former Deputy Administrator with the US’s central drug eradication body, the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), stated that Carlos Castano is a ‘major
cocaine trafficker in his own right’ and has close links to the North Valle drug
syndicate which is ‘among the most powerful drug trafficking groups in Colombia’.38
Donnie Marshall, the current Administrator of the DEA, stated the right-wing
paramilitary groups ‘raise funds through extortion, or by protecting laboratory
operations in northern and central Colombia. The Carlos Castano organization, and
possibly other paramilitary groups, appear to be directly involved in processing
cocaine. At least one of these paramilitary groups appears to be involved in
exporting cocaine from Colombia.’39 Unlike the AUC, however, the FARC ‘tax’ coca
cultivation but are not involved in drug trafficking to US markets. Milford argued
‘there is little to indicate the insurgent groups are trafficking in cocaine themselves,
either by producing cocaine . . . and selling it to Mexican syndicates, or by establish-
ing their own distribution networks in the United States’.40 Marshall stated ‘the
FARC controls certain areas of Colombia and the FARC in those regions generate
revenue by “taxing” local drug-related activities’. He goes on to argue however, ‘at
present, there is no corroborated information that the FARC are involved directly in
the shipment of drugs from Colombia to international markets’ or have ‘established
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international transportation, wholesale distribution, or drug money laundering
networks in the United States or Europe.’41
Klaus Nyholm, the Director of the UN’s drug control agency in Colombia, the
UNDCP, argued, ‘The guerrillas are something different than the traffickers, the
local fronts are quite autonomous. But in some areas, they’re not involved at all.
And in others, they actively tell the farmers not to grow coca’. In the rebels’ former
Demilitarised Zone, Nyholm stated that ‘drug cultivation has not increased or
decreased’ once the ‘FARC took control’.42 Indeed, Nyholm pointed out that in
1999, the FARC were cooperating with a $6 m UN project to replace coca crops
with new forms of legal alternative development.43
In sum, although in some areas some FARC fronts are involved in coca taxation,
both the US’s own agencies and the UN have consistently reported over a number of
years that the paramilitaries are far more heavily involved than the FARC in drug
cultivation, refinement and transhipment to the US. Castano has admitted as much
when he stated that drug trafficking and drug traffickers financed 70 per cent of his
organisation’s operations.44 Instead of the term ‘narco-guerrilla’ a more suitable
phrase would be ‘narco-paramilitary’. However this is a term conspicuous by its
absence and the US has geared Colombian military strategy, and supplied the arms,
exclusively for a Southern push and counter-insurgency war against the FARC. In
short, the ‘war on drugs’ is actually a ‘war on drugs that some FARC fronts tax’ that
totally ignores the paramilitaries’ deep involvement in drug trafficking to US
markets. It seems logical to conclude then, that the US military aid is not actually
for a war on drugs as they are ignoring the biggest drug traffickers. 45
The US’s discontinuity thesis: a war on terror
With the election of President George W. Bush, and in the aftermath of 11 September,
a counter-terror orientation has developed within US policy. This has led to a
blending of the war on drugs with an alleged ‘war on terror’. In Colombia the US
Attorney General John Ashcroft stated; ‘the State Department has called the FARC
the most dangerous international terrorist group based in the Western Hemisphere’
who have ‘engaged in a campaign of terror against Colombians and US citizens’.46
The US Assistant Secretary of State, Otto Reich, argued that the ‘40 million people
of Colombia deserve freedom from terror and an opportunity to participate fully in
the new democratic community of American states. It is in our self-interest to see
that they get it.’47 The Bush administration’s aid package for the Colombian military
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is called the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI). This provides funds for various
countries surrounding Colombia, although Colombia still gets the largest share. The
Bush administration has committed $514 m to Colombia for the year 2002, with 71
per cent of the grant in the form of military aid, and looks set to commit approxi-
mately $700 m for 2003 for what it argues is an extension of its international ‘war on
terror’.48
Chomsky’s continuity thesis: a war of terror
Whilst all the armed actors within Colombia carry out human rights abuses, the
paramilitaries are consistently responsible for the vast majority: leading human
rights organisations attribute over 80 per cent of all abuses to them.49 The para-
militaries have also been shown to have significant and consistent ties with the
Colombian military, the primary beneficiaries of US military aid. Human Rights
Watch (HRW) together with Colombian human rights investigators conducted a
study that concluded that half of Colombia’s eighteen brigade-level army units have
extensive links to the narco-paramilitaries. This collusion is national in scope and
the units include those receiving or scheduled to receive US military aid.50 In its
1999 Human Rights Report on Colombia the US State Department concluded
‘Paramilitary forces find a ready support base within the military and police, as well
as local civilian elites in many areas’.51 The latest HRW report states that there has
been an almost complete failure on the part of the Colombian government to
effectively address ‘the problem of continuing collaboration between its forces and
abusive paramilitaries and military impunity has contributed to a continuing, serious
deterioration in human rights guarantees’.52 They add that ‘the US has violated the
spirit of its own laws and in some cases downplayed or ignored evidence of
continuing ties between the Colombian military and paramilitary groups in order to
fund Colombia’s military and lobby for more aid’.53
The role of the US in Colombia’s paramilitary terror against the Colombian
civilian population is made even clearer considering the fact that US military
advisors travelled to Colombia in 1991 to reshape Colombian military intelligence
networks. This secret restructuring was supposedly designed to aid the Colombian
military in their counter-narcotics efforts. However, Human Rights Watch obtained
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a copy of the order. Nowhere within the order is any mention made of drugs.
Instead, the secret reorganisation focused solely on combating what was called
‘escalating terrorism by armed subversion’.54 The reorganisation solidified linkages
between the Colombian military and narco-paramilitary networks that in effect
further consolidated a ‘secret network that relied on paramilitaries not only for
intelligence, but to carry out murder’.55 Once the reorganisation was complete, all
‘written material was to be removed’ with ‘open contacts and interaction with
military installations’ to be avoided by paramilitaries. This allows the Colombian
government to plausibly deny links or responsibility for paramilitary human rights
abuses which ‘dramatically increased’ after the US reorganisation.56
In effect then, US military aid is going directly to the major terrorist networks
throughout Colombia, who traffic cocaine into US markets to fund their activities.
Moreover, the US has been instrumental in helping make more effective what
Human Rights Watch termed a ‘sophisticated mechanism . . . that allows the
Colombian military to fight a dirty war and Colombian officialdom to deny it’.57
Whilst the so-called ‘war on drugs’ and now a ‘war on terror’ are being waged in
Colombia, it is an element of a much wider and more significant war against the
FARC, the largest leftist insurgency in Latin America and Colombian civil society.
Targeting the coca plantations within FARC territory serves a dual purpose. It
allows Washington to continue to claim that Plan Colombia was an anti-drug plan
whilst pursuing counter-insurgency. But more importantly, by concentrating all of its
efforts towards coca plantations within FARC territory, it cuts off significant tax
revenue for the FARC, thereby making the insurgency harder to fund and thus
sustain. In short, Washington has chosen to ally itself with the terrorist narco-
paramilitaries that share Washington’s common objectives. The ‘war on terror’ is in
fact a ‘war of terror’ reliant upon the Colombian military and paramilitary networks
who carry out the vast majority of abuses against Colombia’s civilian population.58
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Accounting for the continuity 
In the case of Colombia, Chomsky’s continuity thesis is clearly correct, as there is an
unambiguous continuity between Cold War and post-Cold War US foreign policy. I
have argued that the alleged discontinuities serve as pretexts for US intervention.
Although there are always multiple factors feeding into the formulation of US
policy, it is possible to delineate primary causal factors based on official statements
and the declassified record. How then do we account for this policy continuity in the
post-Cold War era? 
The US has substantial economic interests within Latin America in general and
Colombia more specifically. Colombia is the US’s seventh largest oil supplier and
has discovered vast oil reserves within its territory.59 The US has sought to decrease
its post-Gulf War reliance on Middle East oil and diversify its oil supply purchasing
to Latin America. Anne Paterson, the US ambassador to Colombia, explained that
the September 11th attacks have made the ‘traditional oil sources for the United
States’ in the Middle East even ‘less secure’. Sourcing US energy needs from
Colombia which ‘after Mexico and Venezuela’ is ‘the most important oil country in
the region’ would allow ‘a small margin to work with’ and means the US can ‘avoid
price speculation’.60 Paul D. Coverdell, a Republican Senator, explained the wider
regional focus of US policy with the ‘destabilization of Colombia’ directly affecting
‘bordering Venezuela, now generally regarded as our largest oil supplier. In fact, the
oil picture in Latin America is strikingly similar to that of the Middle East, except
that Colombia provides us more oil today than Kuwait did then. This crisis, like the
one in Kuwait, threatens to spill over into many nations, all of which are allies.’61
This in turn necessitates the elimination of any threat to US oil interests. This has
been illustrated clearly with the Bush administration’s request for $98 m for a
specially trained Colombian military counter-insurgency brigade devoted solely to
protecting the US multinational Occidental Petroleum’s 500–mile long Cano Limon
oil pipeline in Colombia.62 If approved by Congress, the US Secretary of State,
Colin Powell explained that the money will be used to ‘train and equip two brigades
of the Colombian armed forces to protect the pipeline’ to prevent rebel attacks
which are ‘depriving us of a source of petroleum’.63 Ambassador Patterson went on
to explain that although this money was not provided under the pretext of a war on
drugs ‘it is something that we must do’ because it is ‘important for the future of the
country, for our oil sources and for the confidence of our investors’.64
Colombia’s war also fits into the classic mode of counter-insurgency that emerged
under President Kennedy’s reorganisation of Latin American militaries. Counter-
insurgency involved looking toward an internal enemy which, during the Cold War,
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became alleged communist subversives. For US counter-insurgency experts, com-
munism was typically manifested through political demands for reforms or popular
organisations that sought a more egalitarian distribution of national resources. Civil
society became the primary barometer of the level and potentiality of ‘subversion’
with paramilitarism integral to counter-insurgency from its inception. An early US
counter-insurgency field manual explained ‘paramilitary units can support the
national army in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations when the latter are
being conducted in their own province or political subdivision’.65 Terrorism directed
against civil society was deemed acceptable as part of the prevailing counter-
insurgent strategy:
Civilians in the operational area may be supporting their own government or collaborating
with an enemy occupation force. An isolation program designed to instill doubt and fear may
be carried out, and a positive political action program designed to elicit active support of the
guerrillas also may be effected. If these programs fail, it may become necessary to take more
aggressive action in the form of harsh treatment or even abductions. The abduction and harsh
treatment of key enemy civilians can weaken the collaborators’ belief in the strength and
power of their military forces.66
General William Yarborough headed the original US Special Forces team sent to
Colombia in 1962 to organise the Colombian military for counter-insurgency. He
argued that a ‘concerted country team effort should now be made to select civilian
and military personnel for clandestine training in resistance operations in case they
are needed’. These teams were to be used to perform ‘counter-agent and counter-
propaganda functions and as necessary execute paramilitary, sabotage and/or
terrorist activities against known communist proponents’ and were to be ‘backed by
the United States’.67
In a manual produced by the US training academy for Latin America, the then-
named School of the Americas, intelligence required identifying ‘the nature of the
labour organizations’ the potential establishment of ‘legal political organizations
that serve as fronts’ for insurgents. Counter-insurgents must monitor the ‘system of
public education’, and the influence of ‘politics on teachers, texts, and students’ and
‘the relations between religious leaders (domestic or missionaries), the established
government and the insurgents’. The manual went on to explain that counter-
insurgents must carefully watch for any ‘refusal of peasants to pay rent, taxes, or
loan payments or unusual difficulty in their collection’, an increase ‘in the number of
entertainers with a political message’, or the intensification of ‘religious unrest’.
Strikes, demonstrations or ‘campaigns for trade union organisation of recruitment’
were similarly considered subversive.68 After an extensive investigation of the SOA’s
training programs the US’s Intelligence Oversight Board stated in 1996 that the
‘School of the Americas and Southern Command had used improper instruction
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materials in training Latin American officers’ from ‘1982 to 1991’. Passages from
these training materials condoned ‘practices such as executions of guerrillas,
extortion, physical abuse, coercion, and false imprisonment’.69
Conclusion
In the case of Colombia, civil society organisations, especially those that seek to
challenge prevailing socioeconomic conditions, are constructed by the US govern-
ment as potentially subversive to the social and political order, and in the context of
counter-insurgency, legitimate targets for ‘paramilitary, sabotage and/or terrorist’
attack. As outlined above, the 1991 post-Cold War US reorganisation of Colombia
military and paramilitary networks and the massive levels of post-Cold War US
funding of the Colombian military serves to underline the continued relevance of
counter-insurgency for destroying movements that may threaten a stability geared
towards US interests. The primary means for what has been called ‘counter-terror’ in
US sponsored counter-insurgency, but what can be more accurately described as
‘terror’, has been the use of paramilitaries. As I have shown, in the Colombian
context, the link between the paramilitaries, the Colombian military and the US is
clear. In the last fifteen years, an entire democratic leftist political party was
eliminated by right-wing paramilitaries; 4,000 activists were murdered in the 1980s;
151 journalists have been shot; in 2002 over 8,000 political assassinations were
committed in Colombia with 80 per cent of these murders committed by
paramilitary groups; three out of four trade union activists murdered worldwide are
killed by the Colombian paramilitaries whilst 2.7 m people have been forcibly
displaced from their homes. According to the UN, lecturers and teachers are ‘among
the workers most often affected by killings, threats and violence-related displace-
ment.’70 Paramilitary groups also regularly target human rights activists, indigenous
leaders, and community activists.71 This repression serves to criminalise any form of
civil society resistance to US-led neoliberal restructuring of Colombia’s economy
and stifle political and economic challenges to the Colombian status quo with
Castano arguing that his paramilitaries ‘have always proclaimed that we are the
defenders of business freedom and of the national and international industrial
sectors’.72 Amidst this repression over half of Colombia’s population live in poverty
according to the World Bank, with those most vulnerable being ‘children of all
ages’.73
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During the Cold War anti-communism served as the ideological vehicle to justify
the repression of any attempt to change the prevailing socioeconomic structure of
Colombian society. In the post-Cold War era anti-drugs and the ‘war on terror’ serve
as the latest justifications for the continued US backing of a terror war in Colombia.
There has thus been a major continuity in US Colombian policy that has crossed
from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period. Furthermore, this policy continues
to have terrible human rights implications and leads to the death of significant
numbers of Colombia’s civilian population whilst maintaining structural inequalities
and destroying any democratic alternatives. In the case of Colombia, these facts
overwhelmingly support Chomsky’s continuity thesis.
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